Tech Effects, Iranian Style

- Technology is more than a noun – it’s a lifestyle!

A lot is said about the effects of technology on our lives. Such effects can be positive or negative, simple or complicated, superficial or profound. The technology is not per se neutral for it intrinsically encourages some special ways of doing things. In my opinion, however, there is no such a thing as good/bad technology because new technologies usually affect our lives in many diverse ways, some of which may be indeed very good while others might be very problematic. The effect’s spectrum gets even wider should various applications developed for a certain technology be considered.

There are numerous examples to cite here, ranging from two centuries old inventions such as Steam Engine to Information-Age phenomena such as World Wide Web. Take, for example, Email. On the plus side, it is cheap, saves time, allows us to make frequent contacts with the people we love and value, and to make it green, it saves tons of trees and fuels every day! On the negative side, it increases the possibility of (mutual) misunderstanding, replaces face-to-face encounters which are (were?) a richer form of communication, contributes to obesity and laziness, increases our exposure to unwanted messages, and even opens the door to new crimes and illegal actions.

By the above, I surely didn’t mean to share with you something new or extraordinary. BTW, above paragraphs was a review. Now I would like to turn my and your attention to a more nuanced aspect of technology’s effects: local characteristics of the effects of global technologies. Or put it slightly differently, recall the title: “Tech Effects, Iranian-Style.”

As it’s self-evident, in such a debate no one can cover all technologies, much less all of their effects. Hence, I would like to focus on a profound effect of Cell Phones: how cell phones helped establish new norms and practices of Privacy. To demonstrate this effect of cell phones on Iranian lifestyle, we first need to know how life used to be before Cell Phone Age.

When I was a teenager, private room was a luxury privilege. (For the first 15 years of my life, my family used to move every year. Some years, I had a semi private room, enjoying solitude during the night but sharing the room with other family members during the day. In other years, I had to completely share the room with another family member.) Another example: I usually had a personal commode. However, it was not that personal: my parents frequently took a look at it, often out of my sight, “just to make sure that everything is OK.” It was kind of a preemptive monitoring, even if there were no sign of threat. BTW, that was a common characteristic of many parents in that period. Diaries had a similar fate as personal commode. Even though I personally didn’t use to write diaries whatever the reason, I’m almost sure that if I did, it would have been subject to unwritten, non-negotiable rule of “preemptive monitoring.”

While these facts surely had something to do with common parental worries, there was another element in them as well. Intimacy and love had a special meaning for parents: the mental arena and most of the physical world should be shared by all members of the family. If it didn’t happen, they would feel as if they were outsiders.

This “your private space makes me feel as if I’m outsider” was a general behavioral rule of that period, not only applicable to parent-child relations but also relevant to peers’ relations. Moreover, “I need some privacy” was often interpreted as “I want to do some bad things.” The rationale for this was very simplistic: if what you want to do is not ‘bad,’ you can do it publicly.
All above facts and analysis converge on one simple point: privacy was not recognized, acknowledged and respected.

Over time, many factors helped transform that situation. In my opinion, Cell Phones played an important role in this regard. When cell phone technology entered Iran, it was an expensive option. To make a comparison, consider that while acquiring a mobile phone subscription would cost around US$ 1,000 just ten years ago, nowadays a prepaid subscription costs only US$ 5. Therefore, in recent years, many Iranians have found Cell Phone affordable and consequently got used to it.

However, the cell phone technology didn’t come alone; rather, a new lifestyle accompanied it. The lifestyle associated with Cell Phone Age may be analyzed in terms of its features. First of all, it has made communications easier and more personal. While family members used to share just one landline phone, today each one of them has his/her own cell phone. Moreover, one can easily define with whom he/she wants to exchange calls and messages. And he/she can easily hide his/her contacts, making them his/her private asset.

In addition to easier communication, cell phone has many built-in features such as calendar, alarm clock, cameras, games and GPS services, each one of which has impacted our culture in its own unique way. What matters in regards to our discussion is portable memory and interface (Bluetooth technology) that allows easy file sharing. In second place after contacts, this feature made cell phones much more personal. One may record or save various files on his/her cell phone, classify them, and define several levels of privacy for those want to access classified files. In some ways, cell phone memories can reflect much of the personality of the owner.

In sum, personal services of the cell phone technology and almost absolute control of the user over it has made some privacy out of it.

As an increasing number of people turned to cell phone and took advantage of its personal features, they better learnt that each person needs his/her privacy be recognized, acknowledged and respected. And in this way, I believe, cell phone technology contributed a lot to the emergence of modern values and norms of privacy.

Cell Phone and its privacy-related effect is just an example to show how profound the effects of new technologies can be. In fact, many other technologies imported to Iran deserve close look to reveal their hidden socio-cultural aspects.

In the end, I would like to emphasize an important point. Even though new technologies “encourage some special ways of doing things” and can introduce a new lifestyle to the society, we have our ways to adapt the technology to our needs and expectations. As George McRobie nicely put it, “The choice of technology, whether for a rich or a poor country, is probably the most important decision to be made.”

P.S. Title of this post is borrowed from Divorce, Italian Style, a 1961 movie. Subtitle is borrowed from William Arthur Ward who once said, “Love is more than a noun – it is a verb.” Many other things are borrowed from many other people. Big thanks to them all.

Slavery Mall in Israel

A few days ago, I came across a piece of news (Prostitution in Israel) in a pro-Ahmadinejad news website, Rajanews. Quoted from another website, significant sentences of the story were as follows:

“In an evident case of promoting indecency and moral corruption in Zionist society, women are displayed for sale in Israel’s chain stores... According to Haaretz, each woman has a label that includes her age, weight, dimensions and country of origin. Following pictures shed some light on modern slavery in Israel, the country which claims to be a democracy.”

Then, some photos of the store, along with ‘Slavery Mall in Israel’ caption, were provided to make the whole story even more striking.

Being sure that something should be wrong with the story, I checked the web. A simple search in Google made it clear: “the display was part of an installation by the Working Group Against the Trafficking of Women, part of a widespread campaign.”

I criticized the fallacy in my Persian weblog and sent an SMS to a friend close to Rajanews administrators, asking them to hire qualified gatekeepers for their website. Several other people made fun of Rajanews as well. Consequently, the page was removed from Rajanews website. (Its cached version is still available in Google, copies of it are available here and here, and to get an impression of its impact, check Persian webpages that reported it).

According to Rajanews, original website that reported the fake story was either Mashreghnews or Qodsna. Given the frank, unambiguous article published in Haaretz, I can hardly imagine that this case could be a simple misunderstanding. Rather, it’s fair to believe that the original news editor/translator distorted the story, assuming that no one would ever dare to find the truth. Such a bitter fact that awkward distortion of the truth is still considered a suitable instrument to manipulate the minds of the audience.

Second implication of the event, however, is far more important. Many Iranians had visited the page, found the story to be consistent with their preconceived perception of the Jewish state, thus related to it and cached it in their long term memory as another indication of Israel’s brutality and corruption. The Israeli society I knew, however, could not be this wild and obscene. That is why I doubted the originality of the story, while many other people, even the educated and the elite, did not even give it a second thought. In other words, average Iranian perception of Israel is far different from the objective truth. Unfortunately, the same point arguably applies to the Israeli side as well.

Opposing or disagreeing with another country is one thing, hating it for non-existent causes is a far different thing. Put it slightly differently, there is a knowledge gap that needs be bridged. When, how and by whom? It’s a difficult yet critically important question.

Dealing behind the scenes

It was almost ten days after disputed presidential election in Iran that I talked to a friend of mine. Massive rallies of reform supporters in Tehran and a few other cities had turned violent, many prominent reformist figures were under arrest and some demonstrators had been killed.

By then, it was almost clear that dissidents could not overthrow Ahmadinejad administration and fulfill their primary dream, i.e. annulling the election or convincing the regime that Musavi should take the power.

My friend had a point: if reform movement was about to give in, it either should achieve something big enough to make its supporters believe “it’s worth what we’ve done, now let’s give up;” or it had to come up with a justified reason to demand an end to demonstrations. In either case, their supporters needed a reason to quit.

The regime, however, was not ready to compromise, believing that it had the upper hand. Reformers had no winning card to take the regime to negotiations table. Hardliner propaganda machine upped the ante, trying to take advantage of the situation, even seeking for the trial of Musavi. Ultra-conservatives claimed that Musavi and reformist movement were responsible for the death of citizens and damages caused to public and private properties for they conducted allegedly illegal demonstrations.

Reformists’ struggle was seemingly bound to fail. They were under harsh criticism of hardliner centers for being connected to foreign powers, trying to destabilize Islamic Republic, and orchestrating a velvet revolution.

By then, there was a widespread rumor that many people detained during demonstrations were tortured and killed in prisons. What turned the page was a piece of official news: son of a top official died in prison.

Mohsen Ruholamini, who was arrested in pro-reform demonstrations, reportedly died in Evin prison. His father was an advisor to Mohsen Rezayi, a member of Expediency Council, general secretary of Justice and Development Party (a moderate reformist party) and a former member of an influential conservative party. Rafsanjani, Rezayi, Zarghami (head of IRI state TV), and parliament speaker offered their respective condolences to his father.

Mohsen Ruholamini was apparently tortured in the prison. His death triggered a wave of criticism of what was going on in prisons. In an important development, Mahdi Karroubi publicly announced that he had found information and hard evidences showing that some prisoners were raped.

Since the very beginning of Islamic Revolution, there had been rumors regarding rape and torture in prisons. Top IRI officials, however, always rejected such accusations. In one case, serial killing of intellectuals by some intelligence agents, the case of torture in prisons got public. Rape, however, was a redline.

At first, regime was reluctant to admit. Lecturers of Friday prayers in the country unanimously criticized Karroubi. They even said that ‘if he fails to prove his accusations, he should be lashed 80 times’ (an Islamic penalty for those accusing an innocent person of adultery and rape).

After a while, rape and torture reports got a momentum. According to Parlemannews,

“A journalist was arrested in post-election demonstrations. For he had been in contact with the office of a senior official [usual slang for Ayatollah Khamenei] since several years ago, he was set free after two weeks. When he paid a visit to that senior official, he was asked to take a seat. But he refused, telling that he could not seat. He said that he was repeatedly raped by stick.”

The hole was too big for the regime to cover. Ayatollah Khamenei ordered the closure of a ‘non-standard prison’ in Kahrizak. A judge was suspended and some agents are waiting for trial.

It seems that the regime finally agreed to a limited compromise. In a speech delivered this week, Ayatollah Khamenei said that reformist leaders were not agents of foreign powers. He added that those who caused death and loss, regardless of their organizational affiliations, should be tried.

This may not be what reformists longed to achieve. However, given the circumstances, it was a noticeable outcome. They were about to be put aside as some ‘non-insiders.’ Moreover, torturing and raping prisoners is a blow to a regime that finds itself the pioneer of morality and Islam. This shall be remembered forever.

Finally, reformists got to save their face and credibility. And the regime is assured that protests are not to be continued, at least temporarily. It might be a deal behind the scene.

Third Revolution

Once there was a revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollahs, overthrowing Shah Regime and destabilizing the Island of Stability for more than a decade. That event not only led to a regime change but also transformed socio-cultural system of Iranian society. Ordinary people who had been directed toward a western life style during Shah Reign were then ready to embrace a fundamentalist, politically aggressive interpretation of Shiite Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini, charismatic founder of Islamic Republic, used to serve as a mentor for whose guides a better part of the society would sacrifice their belongings up to their lives. However, many moderate figures, including administration of Prime Minister Bazargan, were still active in then political atmosphere of Iran. Even though somehow isolated, they could affect some parts of the society and serve as a barrier to many radical decisions.

Almost one year later, there was the Hostage Crisis in Iran. It finally led to Bazargan’s resignation. Ayatollah Khomeini called the event the Second Revolution. He was right in the sense that Hostage Crisis helped radicalize Iran’s politics and put aside moderate figures. For years to come, the voice of hardliners was dominant in Iran.

After demise of Ayatollah Khomeini which coincided with the end of Iran-Iraq war, absence of a charismatic hardliner leader left some room for moderate voices to spread. Compared to Ayatollah Khomeini, the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, barely had the support of masses. In addition, technocrat, pragmatic administration of Ayatollah Rafsanjani, whose main rhetoric was Reconstruction, helped found a relatively strong middle-class whose main concerns hardly included those of founders of Islamic Revolution. The young grown up in that period of time, especially girls with their progressively loosening dress code, turned into the symbol of a generational gap.

No surprise that the new age did need Khatami, a reform candidate promising more freedom and less oppression. From the point of regime’s strategists, Khatami could serve as a safety tube, containing unrests, directing the discontent already available in the society toward less dangerous goals acceptable to senior officials of the regime. Presidents of Islamic Republic are usually supposed to serve two terms. Khatami was no exception.

Even though reform movement failed to bring about changes essentially needed to establish a western democracy, senior officials were reluctant to cope with it for another eight years. Had taken the power for another term, reformists and still-born civil society established in the age of reform could have turned into an existential threat. Moreover, reformists themselves paved the way for a new chapter to begin. The change masses demanded was not in parallel with what senior reformists tried to accomplish.

Khatami had to pass power to a new figure. A controversial election brought Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani to the second round of the presidential election. Even though results of the first round were highly skeptical, Ahmadinejad beating his rival in the second round with a landslide was a clear sign of people demanding the change, again.

In his four years of presidency, Ahmadinejad convinced masses in rural and suburban areas that he should be the one. He gathered many supporters to whose tables were brought a portion of oil income. That fact led senior strategists of the regime to believe that the time was ripe for revenge.

Recent presidential election and its aftermath, whether a political coup or a failed velvet revolution, helped IRI officials put aside moderate figures who were mostly born in the age of Reconstruction and flourished in the age of Reform. In other words, this election helped radicalize Iran’s politics. In this sense, had he been able to send a message, Ayatollah Khomeini would have called Ahmadinejad’s reelection the Third Revolution.

Age of Ahmadinejad

Few days before the election, I met an old friend. As an educated man with a sense of humor, and as a father of two young babies, he made a nice point regarding Ahmadinejad: “when your boy is peeing, don’t stop him. Let him complete his task.”

Ahmadinejad, Miracle of the Third Millennium [1], was a new phenomenon in Iran’s modern politics. As a demagogue, he is capable of convincing ordinary people not linked to intellectuals. This point could be easily observed in the results of the presidential election. Ahmadinejad barely had the support of intelligentsia, the educated people and experts. Rather, his main constituency was composed of rural, suburban and less-educated voters to whose tables were brought some of the oil revenues. Frequent visits he paid to provinces and the huge amount of cash his administration distributed among people were more than enough to convince ordinary people that he would be the one.

Considering pre-election events and official results, one can easily find out that there is a wide gap between experts and masses in today Iran. Lots of voters didn’t pay a minimum attention to the expert’s ideas and this led to the overwhelming victory of Ahmadinejad [2]. This might be a classic example of populist figures winning an election.

Let’s consider some of the examples of the gap between experts’ ideas and those of ordinary people.

In the term of economy, a better part of his supporters fail to understand that Ahmadinejad “is robbing our future to pay us.” With regards to oil income, most of the economists believed that we should follow the example set by Norway, i.e. turning oil revenues into a sustainable capital. (Many Arab countries followed that path.) Ahmadinejad, however, decided to share the cash with the people. It should be noted that, for instance, 50$ donated by the government means a lot to a simple farmer in a far-located village of Iran. However, this farmer can’t understand that deferring his gratification can lead to a more stable (and perhaps larger) source of income. (This is, again, a classic example of a traditional society compared to a modern one. [3])

In the term of politics, his fans can hardly realize long-term consequences of his policies. For example, many political analysts believe that “Ahmadinejad is the kind of enemy Israel likes to hate” [4] for he makes it possible for Israeli officials to justify some of their extreme acts. (As an instance, Israel publicly confessed to having nukes just few years ago for she thought she could justify it, at least partly, referring to Ahmadinejad’s policies and positions he publicly made.) However, many of the hardliners only support him as a symbol of resistance against Zionist regime and international imperialism.

In my opinion, Iran is experiencing populism, full scale. An important feature of this atmosphere reveals itself in paying no attention to the experts and intelligentsia. However, after a while, long-term consequences of populism will be made clear to masses and they will turn again to elites.

Societies usually need to experience populism. This is an almost inevitable part of democratization enterprise. And Iran is no exception to the rule.

Before the election, I used to think that the people were not still ready to swear by expert bodies for they were yet to realize long-term consequences of populism. I’m personally happy that Ahmadinejad won the election. It costs us a lot, true. In my opinion, however, better to experience it once and forever. Better to let Ahmadinejad complete his task.

Footnotes:
[1] A term used by a hardliner fan of Ahmadinejad, wife of his spokesman.
[2] In my opinion, even though there are some indications of limited fraud, Ahmadinejad won the election.
[3] Communication for Development in the Third World, chapter 3.
[4] A France24 commentator once used this phrase.

Upcoming Presidential Election in Iran

Next presidential election in Iran not only matters to Iranians, but also, for good reasons, can affect the region and some of the global affairs. Since the political processes in Iran are almost unknown to foreign observers, it is worth publishing some information about would-be presidents of Iran. Four candidates are running for coming presidential elections in Iran:

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, current fundamentalist president who finds himself bound to win.

Mahdi Karrubi, former reformist parliament speaker.

Mirhosein Mousavi, ex-premier of war time and supposedly most hopeful reformist candidate.

Mohsen Rezayi, former commander-in-chief of Revolutionary Guards.

Many analysts believe that Rezayi is not likely to beat his powerful rivals. Since he left Revolutionary Guards, Rezayi, who got his PhD in economics, has been trying to put on a political, intellectual gesture. In my opinion, he is the best speaker among current candidates, having detailed programs regarding politics, economy, etc. He tries to propose radical changes in some important issues. For example, he chose a woman, Dr. Boroujerdi (grand daughter of Ayatollah Khomeini), to be his foreign affairs minister, "just to beat Hillary Clinton," to use his own words. In addition, regarding Iran-US relations, he is to propose Change Package in which detailed sequence of changes are described that could help remove some of the barriers to better relations. He even said that meeting Obama in next UN summit is possible, given that some good things happen within next few months. Even though he is somehow associated with so-called tradition-minded parties (hardliners), Rezayi has seriously criticized Ahmadinejad. For example, he was quoted as saying "if the trend of current administration is to be continued, it would bring the country to the verge [of destruction]." In addition, he has objected what he calls Political Adventurism of current administration.

Mousavi was Iran’s last premiere in the time of Iran-Iraq war. (After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, some changes were made to Iran’s constitution, one of which was removing premiership, leaving the responsibility of forming the cabinet to the president.) After the assassination of Rajayi, Iran’s second president, Ayatollah Khamenei won the presidential election and chose Mousavi as premier for his first term of presidency. After four years, Ayatollah Khamenei assumed power again for his second term. However, this time he was reluctant to choose Mousavi for they had many problems with each other. Many people, major commanders and politicians among them, asked Ayatollah Khomeini to intervene in favor of Mousavi. Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei, though still reluctant, chose Mousavi as premiere. When Ayatollah Khomeini passed away, Ayatollah Khamenei was elected Supreme Leader and Ayatollah Rafsanjani won the presidential election. Mousavi, once the most popular figure next to Ayatollah Khomeini, got forced to leave political sphere and has been silent since then. Now, major reformist parties support him as their candidate. Many of these parties have fundamental problems with him, but since they swear by him as the most hopeful option competing Ahmadinejad, a strategic alliance is formed so as to beat Ahmadinejad.

Karroubi, the only clergyman among current candidates, is not a strong character by his own. However, he played a significant role in reformist administration and it gave him the chance of winning an influential position among reformist factions. Moreover, after Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, he ranked third in the first round of previous presidential election which was barely expected of him. (It should be mentioned that he publicly objected the result, claiming that some inaccuracies and possible interventions were playing role helping Ahmadinejad go to second round.) In order to arrange for the next campaign, he formed a party, Etemade Melli (national trust). Now, a good team of experts, academics and reformist intellectuals support him.

Ahmadinejad; no need to explain. (I’m afraid if he is going to win. Bernard Shaw once said, “If you rob Peter to pay Paul, you can always be assured of Paul's vote.”)

Iran’s Deterrence Power

This post is an excerpt of an interesting article.

*****

From a general point of view, it seems that Iran’s Deterrence Power is based on 4 basic principles:

1- Avoiding trusting international entities

Considering International Entities and Agencies as ‘means of International Imperialism to Conquer World’ dates back to the very beginning of Islamic Revolution. Iraqi Experience, however, has made Iranian military strategists even more determined not to trust such agencies. According to these strategists, Saddam’s regime for more than a decade cooperated with International Agencies responsible for monitoring production and maintaining its arsenal and these agencies neutralized Saddam’s military capabilities to a great extent. Finally, when they succeeded in completely inactivating Saddam’s arsenal, Bush administration waged a war on Iraq in the name of Weapon of Mass Destruction which never existed at all.

2- Deterrence out of Iranian borders

According to IRI strategists, another important lesson of Iraqi Experience is about encountering Stronger Enemy. They believe that Saddam’s strategy based on encountering occupiers inside Iraqi borders was bound to fail. To avoid similar failure, IRI strategists have maintained that in the case of an American attack on Iran, war zone will be determined by Iran. It means that in the case of war, the aggression will not be limited to Iran, but would include Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine, Gulf countries, as well as other places. That is because, IRI strategists claim, America has offered Iranians some kind of Potential Hostages in the region. In addition to Iran’s own military capabilities, there are some possible allies who would help Iran fight against US in other parts of the region. Even some non-Shiite groups might be eager to help Iran. And this point can help decipher why some statement made by Iranian Officials about Holocaust, Wiping Israel off the Map, etc. Such statements were welcomed by millions of Muslims who hate Israel and are frustrated by other Muslim rulers who ‘are not man of their words.’

3- Getting Ready to Take Maximum Risks in Worst Cases

Iran normally prefers no military invasion. However, IRI strategists believe that Iran should be ready to pay ‘every’ price to make the enemy suffer maximum loss. For example, Iranians are supposedly ready to embrace martyrdom, i.e. to fight to their last drop of blood. In modern wars in which modern capabilities can make patriotism fruitless, such statements may be underestimated. However, Embracing Martyrdom translates into ‘Taking Every Possible Risk’ and that is what, IRI strategists believe, US can’t afford at all.

4- Maximum Preparedness inside Iran

Maximum Preparedness not only includes arranging for Asymmetric War and Passive Defense but also requires eliminating Fifth Column. IRI strategists believe that Iraq’s failure in First Gulf War did not lead to overthrowing Saddam’s regime for a simple reason: there was no alternative to Bathi Government. Hence, as long as there is no alternative to IRI, even a military failure can not lead to regime change. That is why removing every possible alternative would be on IRI agenda in the case of American-led war.

Modern Application of Pleasure in Iran

This post is an excerpt of an intersting article.

*****

Modern Application of Pleasure in Iran

Sexual Politics in Modern Iran, by Janet Afary, takes advantage of modern historiography methods and offers an interesting explanation of gender and sexuality transformation in political, cultural and social contexts of 19th and 20th century Iran.

Very foundation of the book is about sexual revolution in Iran which somehow began with Constitutionalism Movement, had ups and downs, and finally got accelerated in the age of Islamic Republic and compulsory dress code, i.e. Hijab.

This sexual revolution as well as transformation of the meaning and application of Gender and Sexuality is a byproduct of long standing interaction of Iranian society with Ottoman Empire, Russia and West, rise of democratic reforms as well as modern nationalism in Iran.

History of Sexuality in Iran

Sheikh Saadi, known as Morality Teacher, writes: "at the height of youthfulness, as it happens and you are very well aware, I had some sort of affairs with a gorgeous one, a boy."

Amir Onsorol-ma-Ali enjoins his son, Gilan Shah, that: "between boy-slaves and women, do not limit yourself to just one type, so as to enjoy both kinds," and "in summer approach boy-slaves and in winter go to women."

Moreover, Rumi, whose spiritual and mystique status is well recognized, explicitly uses bodily terms to describe sexual intercourse.

Today, however, we can never think of a morality teacher, father or mystique who, following example of Saadi, Amir Onsorol-ma-Ali or Rumi, confesses to homosexual affairs, describes such a relationship or explicitly uses sexual terms.

It's clear that all of the above figures, similar to today teachers, fathers and mystiques, were very well aware of Sharia and morality principles.

Another point is that the lexicon we currently use in Persian to describe erotic events is fundamentally different from the one used up to a century ago.

Gender, sexuality, sexual relationship, homosexuality and some other similar terms are all brand new expressions in Persian. Previous generations, however, had been used to thinking about and speaking about such subjects, and had had a rich lexicon to do so. Hence, is this lingual revolution just a matter of linguistics or, on the contrary, it reflects a comprehensive transformation of subjective and objective worlds of Iranians and Iranian Society?

Sexual Politics in Modern Iran is an answer to above questions as well as some other ones pertaining to transformation of sexuality and sexual pleasure in modern Iran. Here, Modern refers to something more than just contemporary or today.

Sexuality in today Iran is different from it in old Iran, for we have got modernized and modernity has fundamentally changed our understanding and experience of sexuality.

The most important characteristic of the book is its research method. Janet Afary, a well known historian who is mainly experienced in the history of past two centuries of Iran, tries to study modern sexuality and gender transformations with regards to establishment of modern medical, health, legal, religious and political entities in Iran.

In the first part of the book, she proclaims that before Constitutionalism Movement, homosexuality, polygamy, temporary marriage, sex segregation and extended families had been some usual manners that had never faced objection. However, rise of Constitutionalism Movement and agencies attributed to it gave rise to the question of Social Justice and some new regulations were gradually enacted that transformed sexual morale of Iranian society.

In addition, she explains that, for example, modern health in Iran undermined religious justifications for sex segregation, overturned religious understanding of Clean and Unclean, and gave rise to a new understanding of feminine body which granted her a new social role. Medical advancements regarding abortion and repairing hymen led to establishing some new regulations and had a lasting influence on sexual identity of and sexual interaction among citizens.

In addition, rise of police department made the body, especially feminine body, the field of cultural and political conflict. Therefore, Hijab, for the first time in Iran’s history, turned into a social problem and a concern for the government.

Modernity and New Order of Sexual Life

Probably most of the people believe that modernity is followed by more sexual freedom and life in the age of tradition had always been bound to legal and customary restrictions which had severely limited sexual pleasure. Janet Afary believes that such a perception is so naïve and illusive. Sexual Politics in Modern Iran restates that heterosexuality and monogamy, as the only legal, justified norm of sexual behavior, were not enforced by the tradition; in fact, these norms and their moral-legal dominance is a byproduct of modern age.

In fact, modernity in Iran undermined pluralistic and free tradition of sexuality and legalized a simple form of marriage and heterosexuality. For example, even though gay and lesbian behaviors were forbidden by the Sharia, before the advent of constitutional monarch and more exactly before Pahlavi Dynasty assumed power, such behaviors were accepted among various social classes and having intimate relationship and even screwing gorgeous boys was, to an extent, a common practice.

Referring to deeply rooted mystique tradition in Iran, Afary states that Love did not essentially mean an emotional relationship between man and woman and it would include homosexual intimacy as well. Hence, love and sex between persons of the same sex is considered a taboo just in modern times, which is far different from older Love Customs.

Sexual Politics in Iran narrates the transition from older Love Customs to Modern Sexual Economy of Islamic Republic.

Reader finally comes to understand that the tradition backing Islamic Republic is not a historical tradition, but a tradition founded by that political and ideological regime.

For example, even though Sharia had maintained that adulterers should be stoned to death, few examples of older regimes practicing this punishment are available. In the old times, not merely in Iran but also in whole mideast, one can rarely think of a ruler trying a mid-class woman accused of adultery and finally stoning her to death.

Help us find an ARTE documentary to save some Iranian e-Journalists

Almost 4 months ago, a Persian website broke a piece of news: "ARTE satellite channel featured a Dutch documentary which documented Iran Traffic Police Forces' bribery, whose scenes were gathered through sophisticated hidden camera methods." As expected, that piece of news was published so widely among Persian websites.

Administrators of the original website did not provide a sample of the documentary neither did they refer to an authentic source for it. After a while, Iran's Traffic Police (NAJA) sued them. Now they have to bring an authentic source for that piece of information to the court. The problem is that their original source had been a word of mouth from a Swiss man whom they can't locate anymore. Now they are trying to find a clue to that documentary.

At the first glance, it seems that the documentary (if it really be a product of ARTE) should be Deutsche, not Dutch. In addition, original information reveals the name of producer as Van Versen, though this spelling might be misleading thanks to lack of a standard transcription procedure.

So, it's a rather complicated story! That would be a big favor to them if the original documentary is found or some authentic information about it may be isolated. Help us do that.

Jundullah Killed 2 More Captives

According to BBC, Al-Arabia TV Channel states that insurgent Judullah (Army of God) group killed 2 more captives from 16 soldiers who were kidnapped last June in southeastern Iran. Thus the number of soldiers killed by Jundullah reaches 6. However, Iranian officials doubt current and previous claims of Jundullah regarding killing the captives and call it 'psychological war' and 'rumor'.
Al-Arabia TV Channel, located in Kuwait, reported on Saturday that Jundullah (which is active in southeastern Iran) called the channel to reveal that two more soldiers were killed. Jundullah spokesman threatened that "if Iran fails to release 200 of its jailed members, they would kill 2 soldiers every week."
However, it seems that Iran has not taken Jundullah's claims and warnings seriously. Gholamhosein Mohseni Eje'ei, Iran's Intelligence Minister, rejected recent claims and called them 'mere rumors.' He was quoted as saying: "God willing, all of the captives are alive and the claims regarding their martyrdom are not verified. We continue our lobbying and efforts and hope that they will be released as soon as possible."
Meanwhile, an Iranian group headed by Mahdi Hashemi (who is in charge of State Ministry) went to Islamabad to negotiate with Pakistani officials over the fate of captives. No details are revealed except that Pakistan has promised cooperation.
The latest kidnapping happened when Pakistan handed Abdolhamid Rigi (brother of Abdolmalek Rigi, head of Jundullah group) over to Iranian officials. He had been jailed for about 1 year in Pakistan.
Jundullah claims that it is fighting for the cause of Baloch ethnic and religious minority. Iran calls it a terrorist group. Up to now, tens of army officers, statesmen and civilians have been killed in violent campaigns of the group.
[Note: most of kidnapped soldiers were not employed army officers but just some youngsters who had been offering their compulsory military service.]

Just Ahmadinejad can do it

by: Sadegh Zibakalam

I do firmly believe that Iran-US relations' most significant transition which is to emerge is due to the presidency of Mr. Ahmadinejad. Truth is that having diplomatic relations with US is more of a taboo in Iran which may only get broken by a tradition-minded, conservative figure. No one may come to bring about a state of détente, negotiate with US and normalize Iran-US relations, save Ahmadinejad himself. We have not yet forgotten McFarlane event (when Imam was alive) and Mr. Hashemi's efforts to revive Iran-US relations; however, conservatives' powerful hands impeded those efforts and McFarlane event came to standstill. In the period of Mr. Hashemi's presidency, Mohajerani (then advisor to Mr. Hashemi) published a column in Ettela'at daily regarding Iran-US relations, which was much more diluted compare to current expressions of Mr. Ahmadinejad; but conservatives' reaction was so tough that he got forced to publicly apologize. Even when Mr. Khatami, in an interview with Christian Amanpour (CNN correspondent), said some relatively fine things about US, psychological pressures of conservatives forced him to utter some harsh words regarding US just few days later in Imam Khomeini's mausoleum. I think that Ahmadinejad is the only person who may bring about a state of détente. During his presidency, this potential vision has evolved into a practical one. He easily speaks of taking photos with an American commander and his deputy in Iraq, and more easily states that 'if we receive any formal request regarding opening US consulate in Tehran, we will consider it seriously', and such stances do not lead to any reaction from either media or others. I believe that Mr. Ahmadinejad's powerful proponents in the regime make him bold enough to freely speak of having relations with US and even march toward bringing about a state of détente and normalizing the relations. Other side of the coin is US. Current evidences suggest that Barack Obama may win presidential elections. However, I doubt it, for I think that 'Silent Majority' of US voters, who constitute 20-30 percent of voters, have not decided to vote for whom and will decide just few nights before final elections, and they are more likely to vote for McCain only to avoid an African-American finding his way to White House. I hope this is not going to happen. After all, if Obama is to become next US president, vision of normalizing relations with US will be much brighter than ever.

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Sadegh Zibakalam is a leading reformist author and professor of political sciences in Tehran University. This paper was published last week in Shahrvande Emrooz (today citizen), leading reformist weekly.

Wise Word

It's said that a former Japanese foreign minister once said to his Iranian counterpart: "US is like a wild buffalo. You have stuck to her horns, while we try to stick to her breasts."

Ecotourism in Iran

This post was a comment.

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Ecotourism is a relatively new idea in Iran and I’m afraid if there is not an organized effort to promote it right now. National Ecotourism Committee is established, though it might take some time for it to run national-level projects. And some non-governmental sites try to introduce possible ecotourism spots, such as this one.
Meanwhile, there are some established procedures for ecotourists: many travel agencies offer special eco-tours, for example to northern parts of Iran (Gilan and Mazandaran provinces, a semi-mediterranean climate) or Yazd (desert ecotourism).
However, professional ecotourists constitute the main source of ecotourism information. For example, we (I and my wife) have decided to spend two weeks in summer in a northern village. I asked several people, and they offered a relatively detailed description: possible destinations, prices, availability of house/room for rent, some pics, etc.
People are eager to spend some time out of metropolitan areas. Therefore some local ecotourism destinations have come into existence. For example, you may find several villages out of Isfahan (our city) which are relatively well-equipped for a 1-2 week stay. Villagers are increasingly getting aware of this possible source of income, thus try to make a better destination.
I hope that while Ahmadinejad is busy with politics, local efforts provide a proper infrastructure within a decade or so.

It's economically efficient to donate 500 million dollars to Lebanese Hizbollah

According to roozonline.com (Iranian, reformist e-journal), a pro-IRI analyst was recently quoted as saying: "with an oil price of about 120$ per barrel, Iran earns 340 million dollars a day, and 125 billion dollars annually… if we conduct any trouble in Lebanon and if this happens to increase oil prices by 3 dollars per barrel, a sum of about 3 billion dollars will be added to our annual income. Therefore it's economically efficient to donate 500 million dollars to Lebanese Hizbollah."

Minorities in Iran

Here is my comment to a post in MEY about Minorities in Iran, which tries to maintain that Islamic Republic of Iran is systematically and deliberately persecuting religious/ethnic minorities.

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Some of the details you mentioned in this post are probably incorrect or exaggerated (namely gang-raping Zoroastrian girls and ban on music, respectively). In addition some improvements have been made in recent years, for example in the case of 'Bill of Retribution' which finally made the blood money of a non-Muslim equal to that of a Muslim. Moreover officials usually shut their eyes to some of the laws passed by authorities, for example about liquor or pork; you may easily find them in Christian-dominated districts (last week prices of Isfahan: a pork-burger, just 4 dollars).

By the way, I generally agree that minorities (either religious or ethnic ones) are being systematically mistreated in Iran. However it should be noted that socio-political phenomena often follow a continuous pattern throughout both history and region. Therefore if one focuses on one certain episode while ignoring the broader historical and regional contexts, his conclusion is susceptible to flaw.

Firstly, with regards to broader historical context, I have to mention that such discriminations are usually a legacy of the past. (This, however, does not mean that IRI did not contribute to them.) For example about Shiite-Sunni conflict, a balanced view has to consider the events of even 7 centuries ago, even including Safavid-Ottoman wars. Long standing conflicts and lack of dialogue have made such harsh sentiments among Shiite people toward Sunnis that even if IRI decides to remove legal bans, social discrimination continues to exist. And though such 'harsh sentiments' does not usually turn into violent acts, they often translate into political, systematic discrimination thanks to lack of a democratic temperament in Iran (neither socially nor politically). To an extent, same analysis applies to Bahai faith.

Secondly, with regards to broader regional context, it should be noted that regional or even global interactions somehow affect the issue of interest. For example, people rarely distinguish a Jewish businessman from soldiers who allegedly shot Muhammad al-Dura. Or when they hear of rumors/stories of Shiite being persecuted in Saudi Arabia, they can hardly endorse a Sunni mosque in downtown. I know that this is not fair. The solution, however, does not flow from the upward.

Practical guidelines for homo***uals who are about to visit Iran

Here is a funny excerpt of "Practical Guide for Tourists", a series of guidelines for those who are about to visit Iran:

Note: I had to replace 'homosexual' with 'homo***uals', because Iran's intelligent filters block almost every page which has this word in its addresses.

On the current tension in Lebanon

Here is my comment to "Mullahs’ Whim in Lebanon" which claims speaks of Iran's role in the current tension in Lebanon and Arab countries' reaction to it.

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Sustainable stability may never be achieved unless a balance of power comes into existence. In the world’s new order, it was Superpower’s duty to maintain the balance of power. However, right now the only Superpower’s position is frankly in favor of Israel: it has decided to side with Israel, whatever the reasons.
On the other side of the battle, Hizbollah is probably the only armed group which may balance the power struggle with Israel in the Mideast, at least in a psychological level. So, to my view, the American-induced decision of Lebanese administration to destruct this power balance is what might be called an act of destabilizing.
Let me make it clear: I really believe that an armed party is more of a nightmare to the political interactions of both the country and the region. When ‘guns’ find their way in political conflicts, they mark an end to the peace. BUT it’s almost naïve to believe that Hizbollah is merely the product of Iranian/Syrian masterminds. Hizbollah finds its roots in the wrong policies of the US in the Mideast.
Another point is Arab countries’ reactions (mostly that of Saudi Arabia) to the current conflict. I think that Arab countries prefer to have Hizbollah under their own control. In other words, they like the Hizbollah, but not an Iranian-driven Hizbollah. They, however, will not side with US to end the life of Iranian-driven Hizbollah, for this undermines their position against Israel. Thus I think that such reactions are just to remind Iran that “Ana Sharik” (I’m a partner), and Arab leaders don’t want the currant tension to lead to a real confrontation with Iran.

Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, what if Israel attacks Iran and you are elected as president of the USA?

Senator Hillary Rodham Clinto

US Presidential Candidate

Your Excellency,

In one of your recent campaign interviews you stated that: "I want the Iranians to know that if I'm the president, we will attack Iran. . . . In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them" (Interview with ABC).

This is not different from President Bush's stated policy towards Iran. The logic of threatening a total obliteration of Iran, possible only through a nuclear holocaust, is based on the "right of power", not the "power of the right".

As you may know, chapter I, article II of the United Nations Charter states that:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Regardless of any hypothetical attack on Israel, the United States is legally bound not to threaten Iran or any other country. In addition to the UN Charter, the US constitution prohibits such threatening policies. Article IV Clause II states:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

As an Iranian, I feel compelled to ask you some questions. First, why are you threatening "the Iranians"? Second, if Israel attacks Iran and you are elected as president of the USA, what would then be your policy and position?

I do not agree with the rhetorical statements and foreign policies of Dr. Ahmadinejad, the President of Islamic Republic of Iran. However, while the military capability of Iran to attack Israel is questionable, Israel's capabilities concerning the conventional and non-conventional armaments to attack Iran is beyond any doubt.

With respect

Ebrahim Yazdi,Secretary General, Freedom Movement of Iran and

Former Foreign Minister, Islamic Republic of Iran

May 6th, 2008
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Ebrahim Yazdi was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the interim government of Mehdi Bazargan until 6 November 1979, when he, along with the rest of the Bazargan cabinet, resigned in protest of the takeover of the United States Embassy by the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line.

Source

President Ahmadinejad and smoking revival

Last winter, Iran’s Health Ministry in cooperation with Police Forces tried to stop all traditional cafés from serving Qalyan (water pipe) to the customers. It should be noted that two general type of Qalyan have been available in such places: Traditional Qalyan which contains pure tobacco and dates back to several centuries ago, and relatively newer Fruit Qalyan which contains fruit-flavored tobacco. Officials of Health Ministry were determined to at least stop Fruit Qalyan, claiming that its tobacco is of a lower quality and the chemicals used for flavoring the tobacco are highly hazardous. By the way, this act was somehow associated with a broader plan aiming at banning public smoking.

Police forces warned all of the café owners to stop serving Qalyan (or any other kind of smoke) or they would be prosecuted. Some café owners tried to resist, who were finally fined and their shops were closed.

Since Qalyan was the main source of income for such cafés (which used to serve tea, Qalyan and few traditional snacks and foods), most of them experienced a rapid decrease of revenues so that many of them decided to close the shops.

Few weeks later, President Ahmadinejad directly ordered Ministry of State (who is in charge of Police Forces) to abolish the crack down. Since then Qalyan is again available. Yeah, that day was “the re-birth of café owners of Iran” as the below poster states. This poster is available in many traditional cafés, expressing the very thanks of café owners to “beloved, popular president” of Iran. It reads: “thank you, thank you!”

What Young Iranians do in their free time?

Introduction:
Few days ago, a young Swiss boy asked me several questions about young Iranians, including how they spend their free time, how girls might get in touch with boys in Iran, etc. Here is my foreword and answer to his first question: how do young people spend their free time in Iran?

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Foreword:
Residents of various parts of Iran will probably answer such questions in many very different ways. Though some common elements are likely to be found in all of their answers, some factors, including local traditions, geographical specifications and financial status, affect the answers.
With regards to traditions, I should mention that for example in metropolitan areas, most notably in Tehran, it's generally easier for the young to find a friend of the opposite sex, especially if they happen to be university students. Universities in my country bridge the gap between traditional society in which the parents live and modern one in which the children aspire to live. Finding a friend of the opposite sex is only one example of a series of freedoms offered by universities to the young.
With regards to geographical specifications, for example, my city, Isfahan, enjoys a beautiful river with many parks around it, which make it possible for the youth to spend their time in them. In some other areas, for example in northern west of Iran, the weather is so cold during the winter that people can hardly spend their free time during the cold season (which sometimes extends to half of the year) outside. Therefore, they are likely to invest in some suitable options such as cinema or café-net (I will explain this phenomenon in later parts).
And finally with regards to financial status, this factor affects the hobbies the young choose in 2 ways: first, well-to-do families are usually more liberal, offering their children a higher degree of freedom. Second, having enough money, the people might afford more expensive options for their free time.
The question "how young Iranians spend their free time" seems to be the an important one whose answer would cover other questions to an extent, thus I would try to provide a comprehensive answer for it, and then briefly answer other questions.

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How do young people spend their free time in Iran?
A: National TV
Iranians are obsessed with TV. Official statistics reveal that some serials, including drama and especially comedy serials (which are usually planned for 90 episodes and broadcast every night during a full season), attract 60% of the population. Iran's National TV broadcasts 6 channels in the national level, a recently launched English News Satellite Channel (called PressTV), in addition to some provinces broadcasting provincial channels.
6 national channels are called: Channel One (general), Channel Two (general), Channel Three (mainly focusing on Youth and Sports), Channel Four (with a scientific-cultural focus, sometimes broadcasts original English documentaries of BBC and other famous channels), News Channel (24/7 news channel), and Quran Channel. Channel Three is perhaps the most interesting one to the youth.
B: Satellite Channels
In spite of satellite receivers being legally banned, the regime seems reluctant to crack down those who exploit satellite receivers. Some non-official reports indicate that in metropolitan areas, up to 40% of households have access to satellite channels. 10 years ago, 'satellite receiver' was supposed 'evil' by most of Iranians, but today people are somehow used to it.
Let's classify satellite channels in two classes: Persian channels, and non-Persian channels.
With regards to Persian satellite channels, most of them are Political ones launched to oppose Iran's regime, but they can not compete with National TV, thus fail to attract a fair amount of viewers. In addition to political ones, there are some other channels such as PMC (Persian Music Channel) which are dedicated to broadcasting music clips. Since such clips are banned in National TV, PMC has turned into one of the most favorite channels of Iranians.
With regards to the other class, in Iran, English is ranked above other foreign languages in terms of the number of people who try any second language. In addition, English is a compulsory part of schools curriculum since 7th grade. An average Iranian, however, is not familiar with English enough to take advantage of English satellite channels. Then, the only foreign satellite channels interesting to Iranians are porno, fashion and wild life ones.
C: Internet
The youth are eager to break the mold and cross the boundaries set by either the traditional society or the regime. The public atmosphere, however, is not ready to cope with the youth who might allegedly betray the very values of the nation. Therefore, the youth resort to private atmosphere so as to satisfy their needs.
Internet is a good example of such private worlds. One might easily find out that the cyber Iran is far different from, and probably not comparable with the real Iran. In a western country, web is generally supposed to facilitate the real life. But to the young Iranians, web brings a far different meaning: it is supposed to help the youth get rid off the real life and its limitations.
What do I mean by 'limitations of real life'? Dress code, boys-girls relations, porn, fashion, etc. are some examples of these limitations, but the real limitation is far more general than these examples. Some sociologists believe that there is a wide gap between first generations of post-revolution Iran and today generation, i.e. Iran has experienced a kind of rapid cultural shift, and the new generation finds it difficult to express itself in the real world dominated and ruled over by old generations. Therefore, it seeks to express itself in the cyber world. Between all various web features, 'chat' and 'weblog' are the most interesting ones to young Iranians. Due to these reasons, café-nets (originally cafés providing internet services along with coffee and tea, but today only internet providers) have mushroomed in big cities.
D: Cafés
There are two kinds of cafés in Iran: traditional and modern. Modern cafés are almost similar to European cafés, serving various kinds of non-alcoholic drinks (coffee, tea, soft drinks, lemonade), foods (pizza, vegetarian dish, snack), cakes (fruit, caramel, chocolate cakes), etc. On the other hand, traditional cafés serve just tea, Qalyan (water pipe: a kind of traditional Iranian smoke) and few traditional foods. Generally speaking, traditional cafés are cheaper and attract more young Iranians.
E: Parks, Mountain Parks
Parks are also a well-known destination for the youth. In addition, some nearby mountains are equipped to serve as a park: camps, rest rooms, barbecues, play grounds, etc.
In addition, in almost all of the big cities, some parks are dedicated to women so that they can freely spend their time while not being forced to wear Hijab (Islamic dress code). In these parks they are allowed to practice some activities which would be considered indecent otherwise, such as sun bathing.
F: Parties
Young people frequently arrange parties, but the scale and type of the party depends on several factors. Single-sex parties, including just boys or girls, often for birthdays, may be held very easily and families get along with them. But if some are to invite both girls and boys, or include alcoholic drinks, they have to accomplish some problems. Most important of all, police forces crack down such parties if they happen to include drugs or sex, or if the neighbors complain about.
G: Educational Programs
Several institutes offer educational programs, including language, computer, art and occupational courses. Young people, especially girls, express a lot of interest to these programs and choose them for their own free time.
H: Trips
Trips are possible from 1-day journeys to 1-week or even more ones. For religious people, some holy mosques or the graves of saints constitute a suitable option. Wealthy families usually own gardens out of the city, or villas in the coast of the sea, and spending a day or night in them is a common choice.
It should be noted that some certain areas in the coast are dedicated to women so that they have fun freely.
I: Sport
In addition to specialized clubs, many areas and parks have chess tables, skate grounds, ping pong tables, etc. Billiard clubs are also a luxury option. Swimming pools are available with some hours booked for women.
Virtually, almost all kinds of sports are available to young Iranians. But it should be noted that as expected, girls are supposed to submit to dress/moral code. This code, however, is not a definite one throughout the nation. For example, though people in bigger cities are getting used to girls biking for fun or transportation, smaller cities are less likely to observe the girls doing the same stuff.
J: Hanging Out
Just do it!